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A STUDY OF THE CONCEPT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 







The purpose of the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) approach is to introduce more-
streamlined industrial practices and state-of-the-industry technology into Government 
acquisition. The LSI is designed to assist the Government in analyzing requirements and 
managing the development of system-of-systems for acquisition programs. The purpose 
of this study is to analyze the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) concept and how it 
facilitates defense system development and acquisition. This research project evaluated 
the concept of the LSI by examining its use in the Army’s Future Combat Systems and 
the Coast Guard’s Deepwater programs. These two force-modernization programs are 
composed of a complex system-of-systems design acquired through a LSI.  This report 
clearly defines the LSI and the conceptual concerns surrounding its implementation, as 
well as describes the Army’s Future Combat Systems and the Coast Guard’s Deepwater 
Programs’ experiences with the LSI.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to analyze the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) 
concept and how it facilitates defense system development and acquisition. The data for 
this analysis are from one Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) and one 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) acquisition program, both described below. 
B. BACKGROUND 
This project describes the Lead Systems Integrator concept through the 
experiences of two acquisition programs: the Army’s Future Combat Systems and the 
Coast Guard’s Deepwater program. The LSI can be described as a contractor hired by the 
Government to oversee the design, development and procurement of large system-of-
systems programs. The contractor holds inherently governmental authority in order to 
manage the program’s cost, schedule, and performance variables.  The LSI’s authority 
gives it great latitude in ensuring seamless integration of information and technologies.  
However, this authority also can be a potential risk, as the LSI is a corporate entity whose 
interests may not coincide with the best interests of the Government.  The organizational 
conflicts of interest between the LSI and the Government, due to its corporate (i.e., profit 
seeking) nature, may erode the integrity of information passed on to the customer and 
lead to less than optimal decisions. While these sociological factors are inherent in all 
contractual arrangements, they pose a greater risk with a LSI due to the large and 
complex nature of these programs.  
1. Army’s Future Combat Systems 
The Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) is a force modernization program that 
exploits the benefits of private-sector business practices. FCS is the Army’s largest force-
modernization program to date, consisting of a multitude of manned and unmanned 
ground vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles and a complex communications network that 
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links all systems to ensure operational integration in a system-of-systems architecture. A 
system-of-systems can be described as an arrangement or a set of systems that are 
interconnected to provide a capability. The system-of-systems is composed of individual 
modules, and the removal of one or more modules will cause the total system 
performance to degrade.  This program’s complexity led the Army to utilize the LSI 
concept.  It believed private industry’s knowledge of system design and development 
would provide the best solutions for its needs.   
2. Coast Guard Deepwater Program 
The Coast Guard’s Deepwater program is designed to modernize the Coast 
Guard’s aging fleet of deepwater assets with new cutters, aircraft and command and 
control capabilities.  The Deepwater program is the Coast Guard’s largest modernization 
program to date. The program is designed to utilize a system-of-systems acquisition 
approach in that the acquisition efforts are focused on acquiring capabilities rather than 
platforms.  Much like the Army’s FCS, the complexity of the Deepwater program led the 
Coast Guard to utilize the LSI concept in order to provide a seamless integration of new 
technologies.   
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
The primary research question is:  
• What is the concept of the Lead Systems Integrator? 
2. Supplemental Research Questions 
The supplemental research questions are:  
• How could the conceptual approach of the LSI increase the Government’s 
probability of attaining the best-value? 
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• How effective was the implementation of the LSI — based upon cost, 
schedule, and performance? 
D. SCOPE 
This project analyzes the LSI implementation for two separate programs under 
two different Government organizations. It provides a detailed background and historical 
perspective on the development of both programs and how the LSI has been integrated 
into them. This project analyzes the perceived effectiveness of the LSI from the 
viewpoints of cost, schedule and performance. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology for this study included reviews of documents produced 
by the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. 
Government reports related to the LSI, Deepwater and FCS programs.  We analyzed 
these documents to clarify the LSI concept.  In conjunction with data from these 
documents, we also closely examined the program contracts in order to understand and 
evaluate the implementation of the LSI within the two programs.  In addition, we 
conducted interviews with personnel from both the FCS and Deepwater programs, as 
appropriate, so that we could incorporate their views into our analysis.   
F. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
The benefits of this research are the formulation of a descriptive definition of the 
LSI; a fundamental understanding of the degree to which the LSI can facilitate Defense 
system development and acquisition; and an evaluation of the performance of the LSI 
based upon two actual programs. The definition of the LSI will describe what a LSI 
consists of and what its actual responsibilities are. The fundamental understanding of the 
LSI will allow the reader to recognize the potential benefits and pitfalls of using this 




quantitative data on cost, schedule, and performance in both the Army and Coast Guard 
programs, will give the reader an evaluation of the LSI in real-world applications and not 
just in theory. 
G. ORGANIZATION 
The study is organized as follows: 
• Chapter I: Introduction—Addresses the scope of the project, identifies our 
methodology, presents research questions, and states the benefits of this 
research. 
• Chapter II: Lead Systems Integrator Concept —Defines the Lead Systems 
Integrator, the rationale that led to its implementation and the potential 
pitfalls of this acquisition approach. 
• Chapter III: The Army’s Future Combat System—Provides a history and 
description of the Army’s Future Combat Systems, as well as the 
program’s contract history. 
• Chapter IV: The Deepwater Program—Provides a history and description 
of the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program, as well as the program’s 
contract history.  
• Chapter V: Lead Systems Integrator Implementation—Provides 
quantitative data to show the strengths and weaknesses of the LSI concept. 
• Chapter VI: Summary, Conclusion, and Recommendations—Evaluates the 
data in Chapters II through V and discusses recommendations for further 
research. 
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II. LEAD SYSTEMS INTEGRATOR CONCEPT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter explains the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) concept in the context of 
the Army’s FCS Program and the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program.  An LSI can be 
described as a contractor hired by the Government to oversee the design, development 
and procurement of a large system-of-systems. The LSI is given substantial authority to 
perform program management tasks that Government entities have traditionally 
performed. 
This chapter presents the definition of a LSI according to the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2006, as well as a practical definition that has evolved out of the 
application of the LSI concept. The description of the system-of-systems concept 
provides the reader with the necessary background for understanding why a LSI was 
considered to be the optimal acquisition approach for a system-of-systems. The system 
integrator role in a system-of-systems is also described in order to clarify the duties of an 
LSI.  The chapter also explains each of the program’s reasons for choosing a LSI 
acquisition approach, as well as the reasons that any Government entity would choose a 
LSI for a large acquisition program.   The chapter ends with a sociological analysis of the 
LSI concept, as well as a presentation of potential challenges of implementing an LSI. 
B. DEFINITION OF THE LSI 
The definition of the LSI concept has gone through many iterations, leading to 
misunderstandings of the LSI’s responsibilities. Thus, it is necessary to adequately define 
key terms to clarify the LSI concept.  
1. Lead Systems Integrator 
The Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act defines two types of 
LSIs: 
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• Prime contractors who develop major systems and who are expected at the 
time of the contract award to perform a substantial portion of the work on 
the system and major subsystems. 
• Contractors who perform acquisition functions that are inherently 
governmental in the development of a major system (Grasso 2). 
a. Prime Contractors  
The first portion of this definition addresses the LSI as a prime contractor for a 
large system.  The specification of the amount of work the prime contractor performs is a 
safeguard to ensure that a contractor does not outsource all work, failing to maintain 
proper quality-control and acquisition procedures.  Thus, one might believe that a LSI 
does not necessarily subcontract out the majority of the work for a system.  However, our 
research shows that the LSIs for the FCS program and the Deepwater program actually 
do subcontract a majority of the work.   Therefore, this aspect of the definition is not 
applicable to FCS’s and Deepwater’s LSIs. 
b. Inherently Governmental 
The second part of the LSI definition addresses the LSI as a contractor who 
performs inherently governmental activities.  The Office of Management and Budget 
Circular A-76 gives a broad description of what is inherently governmental. An 
inherently governmental activity is any activity that affects the ability of the federal 
Government to use discretion in decision making.   
While inherently governmental activities require the exercise of 
substantial discretion, not every exercise of discretion is evidence that an 
activity is inherently governmental. Rather, the use of discretion shall be 
deemed inherently governmental if it commits the Government to a course 
of action when two or more alternative courses of action exist and decision 
making is not already limited or guided by existing policies, procedures, 
directions, orders, and other guidance that (1) identify specified ranges of 
acceptable decisions or conduct and (2) subject the discretionary authority 
to final approval or regular oversight by agency officials. (Executive 
Office of the President and Office of Management and Budget A.2) 
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The important aspect of this definition is that an inherently governmental action is 
not necessarily the decision-making action, but, rather, the ability to influence the 
decision-maker’s judgment.  The LSI concept, as it was utilized in the two subject 
programs in this analysis, is more closely correlated with this aspect of the LSI definition 
than with the first. 
In order to oversee the design and development of a system-of-systems, the LSI 
must have intimate knowledge of the systems being developed and how they will be 
integrated with each other.  The Government agency relies on the LSI’s knowledge and 
expertise to make program-related decisions.  This dependence on the LSI can create a 
situation in which the LSI has extensive influence over the direction the program may 
take and uses its influence to adversely affect Government decision-making.  It is the use 
of its extensive influence that gives it an inherently governmental role.   
The FCS and Deepwater programs are both system-of-systems programs 
requiring complex integration activities.  The complex nature of both programs drove the 
Army and the Coast Guard to adopt a LSI approach that would confer inherently 
governmental tasks to the awarded contractor(s).  In essence, the programs were prime 
candidates for a LSI because they were considered too large and complex to manage 
otherwise. 
The Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act’s definition of the LSI 
has served as its standard formal definition. However, this definition fails to address the 
key components and characteristics of a LSI as it pertains to the two subject programs in 
this research. This research defines the LSI as follows: 
• Contractors who are responsible for system integration of system-of-
systems acquisition programs, and 
• Contractors who perform inherently governmental activities in managing 
system-of-systems acquisition programs.  
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C. SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS 
Our modification of the LSI definition addresses the system-of-systems 
characteristic of the programs associated with an LSI.  It is important to understand the 
system-of-systems concept in order to properly ascertain the duties of the LSI.  The 
concept of the LSI grew out of the perceived necessity to successfully acquire large-scale 
system-of-systems acquisition programs.  While there is no universally accepted 
definition of a system-of-systems, this phenomenon is widespread across many different 
industries, ranging from air defense networks to commuter transportation systems 
(Manthorpe Jr. 305–310).  The definition of a system-of-systems used for this analysis is 
as follows:  
A set or arrangement of interdependent systems that are related or 
connected to provide a given capability. The loss of any part of the system 
will significantly degrade the performance or capabilities of the whole. 
(Defense Acquisition University 1) 
The two programs used for these analyses are system-of-systems acquisition 
programs because they are not simply composed of a single weapon platform or a piece 
of machinery, but of an inter-networked system that operates congruently to provide a 
war-fighter capability. LSIs are contractors (and, in many cases, teams of contractors) 
who work with the Government to manage the development and creation of these 
systems to ensure that the various component systems interact effectively. Their duties 
are far-reaching in that LSIs possess substantial authority to define and execute these 
programs. The duties of the LSI may include requirements generation, technology 
development, source selection, procurement of systems, testing, validation and 
management of suppliers and sub-contractors (Grasso). 
A system-of-systems requires a large amount of compatibility among its sub-
systems to ensure integration.  The integration of all systems is a pivotal activity in the 
successful acquisition of a system-of-systems.  Because the Army and the Coast Guard 
were unable to accommodate the integration workload of large system-of-systems, they 
adopted the Lead Systems Integrator approach to facilitate the seemingly insurmountable 
managerial effort needed. 
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D. SYSTEMS INTEGRATOR 
We discuss the role of the systems integrator in order to describe the typical duties 
of a LSI from a systems engineering perspective.  The Handbook of Systems Engineering 
and Management states that systems integration plays a critical role in system 
development. Specifically, the systems integrator must be involved in “interpreting the 
overall performance needs of a sponsor into technical performance specifications and 
ensuring that these system requirements are met” (Palmer 483).   This interpretation of 
overall performance needs is analogous to requirements refinement in Government 
acquisitions.  However, the LSI has the latitude to determine requirements at a much 
higher level than has been previously afforded any traditional prime contractor.  A 
traditional prime contractor is normally given a requirement for an asset, such as a tank, 
aircraft or artillery system.  The FCS and Deepwater programs have overarching 
requirements for capability needs—as opposed to asset or platform needs—and, 
therefore, depend heavily on the LSI to refine requirements in order to fulfill their 
capability needs with assets and platforms. 
The systems integration role in large, complex engineered systems must provide 
an “organized, sensible, accountable, and workable approach to otherwise seemingly 
incomprehensible programs” (Palmer 483).  This aspect of the systems integration role 
deals in large part with managing complexity.  The FCS and Deepwater programs are 
both considered large, complex modernization efforts by their respective departments. 
The integration of the many systems in these programs into a system-of-systems 
architecture is where the complexity lies.  The systems integrator should ideally manage 
the complexity of a program by performing the following functions: 
• Develop and utilize a strategic plan for management and technical aspects 
of the program. 
• Establish a complete audit trail. 
• Assist in meeting initially unrecognized needs (including changes in 
system requirements). 
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• Avoid under- and over-procurement. 
• Develop and utilize risk-management plans. 
• Manage subcontractors to the same specifications employed by the prime 
contract. 
• Provide for future modifications and expansions. (Palmer 483) 
E. WHY THE LEAD SYSTEMS INTEGRATOR WAS CHOSEN 
Due to the complexities inherent in a system-of-systems architecture, both 
services chose to use a cooperative acquisition approach in order to successfully develop 
and acquire their respective programs in a timely manner. There are three main reasons 
why the Government chose a LSI for these programs: 
• The program is complex. 
• The service has inadequate acquisition capability.  
• The Government entity wishes to encourage competition.   
1. Program Complexity 
The LSI for the FCS program was to provide the necessary system engineering 
and program management skills to develop, procure and integrate all systems in the 
program.  Some of the key technological developments of the program are provided 
below as an example of the complexity associated with the FCS program. 
• The 14 major weapon systems or platforms have to be designed and 
integrated simultaneously and within strict size and weight limitations.  
• At least 46 technologies that are considered crucial to achieving critical 
performance capabilities will need to be matured and integrated into the 
system of systems.  
•  The development, demonstration, and production of as many as 170 
complementary systems and associated programs must be synchronized 
with FCS content and schedule. This will also involve developing about 
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100 network interfaces so that the FCS can be interoperable with other 
Army and joint forces.  
• The program requites the creation of an estimated 63 million lines of 
software code, more than three times the number being developed for the 
Joint Strike Fighter program. (Francis, “Role of the Lead Systems 
Integrator” 7)  
The initial plans for the FCS forecasted the development being complete in five- 
and-a-half years, a much shorter period than the Army typically requires to complete 
development of just one system using traditional acquisition methods and capabilities 
(Francis, “Role of the Lead Systems Integrator”).  The complexities inherent in the FCS 
program, along with the accelerated schedule and the lack of maturity in key 
technologies, were risks that the Army hoped to mitigate by using a LSI.  To address the 
technology maturity issues and bring superior strategies and solutions to the development 
of the FCS, the LSI would use more adaptive organizational and manpower techniques 
than the Army would. 
The Deepwater program had similar complexity issues, associated mainly with 
the interoperability aspect of the program.  The assets in the Deepwater program, 
including the command and control and logistics support systems, would all be procured 
in a single integrated package.  The Coast Guard had never before attempted this type of 
procurement.  The scope of the program involved developing multiple platforms—both 
maritime and aerial—simultaneously to ensure interoperability among assets.  The 
Deepwater program’s focus was on a system-of-systems approach for acquiring 
capabilities, and in order to accommodate the complexity of a system-of-systems 
approach, the Coast Guard used a LSI. 
2. Inadequate Acquisition Capability 
Throughout the years 1994-2005, acquisition initiatives reduced the DoD 
acquisition workforce by more than 50 percent (Grasso). This left a void of capability in 
defense acquisitions, which the Army viewed as limiting its ability to execute the 
necessary systems integration tasks for the FCS program with its own acquisition 
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personnel.  The program’s short timeline and its complexity led to the following 
assessment of the shortfalls in acquisition manpower:   
• the inability to cross traditional organizational boundaries 
• a shortage in key skill sets: namely the skills required to develop the 
information network 
• insufficient resources to properly man and staff the many program offices 
needed to manage the program. (Flood) 
A systems integrator for a system-of-systems would need to function across a 
variety of organizational boundaries.  This is especially important when refining 
requirements and designing solutions for user capability needs.  The integrator must be 
able to work across the entire spectrum of war-fighting communities, such as aviation, 
infantry, armor and field artillery.  The Army Acquisition Corps lacked the experience in 
coordinating developmental efforts among the war-fighting communities. (Francis, “Role 
of the Lead Systems Integrator”). The FCS is the first program to integrate all war-
fighting assets into a system-of-systems from inception.  The legacy stovepipe process of 
developing systems independently was inadequate for FCS.  LSIs could easily work 
through the organizational boundaries because they are not part of the Army organization 
and have no problem “stepping on toes” in order to coordinate; thus, there would be few 
professional ramifications on their end.  The LSI facilitates the coordination between user 
and developer in much the same way. 
The majority (approximately 95 percent) of the FCS’s performance depends on 
software (Francis, “Role of the Lead Systems Integrator”).  The Army had sufficient 
expertise in developing weaponry such as tanks, artillery pieces and infantry fighting 
vehicles from years of experience.  However, the software and network development 
effort of the FCS program is significant, and integrating the development of the platforms 
with the network and software is critical.  The Army did not have the sufficient expertise 
in software engineering to adequately manage a program of FCS’s magnitude.  The 
software is estimated to be approximately 63 million lines of code, and though lines of 
code can be a deceiving metric for measuring software effort, it is still far larger than any 
other Army acquisition program.  
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If the Army had tried a traditional acquisition approach, it would have attempted 
to organize itself into separate program offices that coincide with each system within the 
program.  Each program office would have individually contracted out their portion of 
the FCS with a prime contractor.  There would have been one major integration program 
office to oversee the actions of all different system offices in order to ensure compliance 
with a system-of-systems architecture (Flood).  The coordination effort would have been 
extremely difficult given the location and organizational boundaries existing in traditional 
acquisition channels.  Therefore, the Army decided to utilize an LSI to perform the 
integration and coordination efforts needed to enforce a system-of-systems architecture.  
The LSI would perform managerial tasks that used to be done primarily by Government 
employees, such as managing the development of large systems in the FCS program, 
systems that would have traditionally warranted their own individual program offices 
(Flood).   
The Coast Guard made a similar assessment of its own acquisition capabilities 
when deciding to use a LSI.  The Deepwater program’s system performance specification 
required a substantial number of facilities and personnel capable of handling the complex 
task of systems integration.  Though the Coast Guard had certain facilities to handle 
discrete elements of the Deepwater program, it did not have the facilities, manpower or 
expertise to accomplish the totality of the work required (McDaniel).  This assessment of 
current acquisition capability and manpower led the Coast Guard to contract with a 
private entity to handle the system integration tasks.   
The Coast Guard realized that the Deepwater program’s LSI would need to have 
access to proprietary information across the spectrum of Deepwater assets.  Much of the 
work for the Deepwater program was being done by subcontractors.  Normally, a 
Government entity would have to establish a contract with a private entity so that the 
Government could gain access to proprietary data, but the use of a LSI would establish a 
streamlined way of crossing organizational boundaries across the private industry.  The 
LSI would be able to contract with subcontractors more easily than the Government 
would and, hence, gain access to proprietary data quickly in order to make timely  
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decisions.  Since the Coast Guard did not have an adequate number of acquisition 
personnel to replicate this streamlined contracting process, it chose a LSI to handle the 
cumbersome subcontracting process (McDaniel).   
3. Encourage Competition  
The emphasis placed on encouraging competition stems from the traditional 
practice of prime contractors picking subcontractors from their own supply pool.  If the 
Government utilized traditional prime contracting methods for these programs, then the 
prime contractor would normally pick subcontractors from their own supply pools 
without developing a plan for encouraging competition. The Government traditionally 
never became involved with subcontractor selection because its contract was solely with 
the prime contractor. This practice is questionable when many of the subcontractors will 
be providing the majority of the products for the system.  The Army set up the program 
so it would have more influence over the LSI’s selection of subcontractors (Francis, 
“Role of the Lead Systems Integrator”).  The contract essentially mandates competition 
in the tiers of contractors below the LSI.  The Army maintained decision-making 
authority as to which subcontractors will be selected and could determine if competition 
exists.  This safeguard provided the Army with visibility of the contractors in lower tiers.  
This visibility, in turn, provided the Army with a management capability to ensure that 
interoperability and commonality existed amongst all subsystems in FCS.   
Coast Guard acquisition officials discussed the possibility of awarding a contract 
to one entity for the responsibility of systems integration and awarding separate contracts 
for the development and production of individual assets.  However, this method was seen 
as a violation of the limited competition authority of the Coast Guard; therefore, the 
option was eliminated from consideration (McDaniel).  The Coast Guard wanted to 
encourage competition in the Deepwater program and not limit it through the long 
Government contracting process.  Giving the systems integrator the contractual power to 
subcontract with other private-sector entities for development and production of the 
Deepwater assets was seen as an ideal solution to encourage competition in the private 
sector. 
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F. SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
It is important to analyze the relationship between the LSI and the Government 
within a social context, as the LSI takes on responsibilities that used to be the sole 
domain of the Government.   Principal-Agent Theory, or Organizational Conflicts of 
Interest, (Guttman 297) are social aspects inherent in the LSI concept that can be 
detrimental to Government interests. 
Organizational Conflict of Interest (OCI), also known as Principal-Agent Theory 
(PAT), is a situation in which entities act in two or more roles that are at odds with each 
other. The LSI is a for-profit corporation that is taking on inherently governmental 
functions and integrating technologies from additional corporations. The central dilemma 
of the Government (the principal) is how to get the LSI (the agent) to act in its best 
interest, despite the fact that the LSI holds an informational advantage. The LSI (the 
agent) is tasked with managing information and people while providing the Government 
(the principal) with the best value—yet, the agent’s interests are different from the 
principal’s. The LSI’s corporate interest manifests itself in profit-driven goals.  Thus, the 
LSI’s dual role as program manager and employed contractor for the Government can 
result in an OCI.  If the agent’s best interests are not in line with the principal’s, there can 
be no guarantee that an OCI will not adversely affect the program. An additional concern 
that may arise out of an OCI is that the LSI’s presence may be seen as a threat to 
potential subcontractors’ proprietary information. Subcontractors may be unwilling to 
accept the risk of giving up proprietary information to an LSI who has inherently 
governmental authority.   
Information integrity is a key consideration that arises from OCI.  It can have far-
reaching implications by altering the Government’s decision-making. Information 
integrity is defined as “the trustworthiness and dependability of information. More 
specifically, it is the accuracy, consistency and reliability of the information content, 
processes and systems” (Infogix 1). 
As the LSI is an entity that already possesses organic OCIs based upon corporate 
interest, this organic OCI may cause concerns about the integrity of the information 
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provided to the Government for decision-making. The concept of information integrity is 
not solely concerned with the quality of the information, but also with whether or not 
such information is unbiased, theoretically sound, and not created as a byproduct of an 
OCI.  
Any entity that utilizes an LSI must also possess the managerial oversight 
resources to analyze information from the LSI and take over its functions long enough to 
find a replacement if necessary.  This very dilemma arose in the spring of 2007 when the 
Coast Guard removed the LSI from its Deepwater program, only to rehire the same LSI 
within the month due to the lack of adequate personnel to analyze and validate all the 
tasks for which the LSI had been responsible. (Biesecker, Allen and Skinner) 
G. CHALLENGES OF THE LSI 
As discussed in Section D of this chapter, the role of the LSI as a systems 
integrator gives it complete information access across the entire program. This access 
enables the LSI to provide oversight, yet, at the same time, may also serve as a deterrent 
against innovation and dissuade contractors that have valuable trade practices. Along 
with OCI, which may prevent the Government from receiving the best value, additional 
concerns arise because the LSI is a private business entity that can potentially be 
indispensable.  The three major concerns are:  
• Large, private-sector entities may not be attracted to working under a LSI, 
as the LSI may be viewed as a direct competitor in the near future. 
• The LSI holds the complete knowledge base of a Government program, 
making it difficult for the Government to remove the LSI due to poor 
performance and replace it with another corporation. 
• Should the LSI run into financial difficulties that might result in the 
company defaulting on the contract, the Government may be forced to 
subsidize the contractor in order to keep a program from failing. 
Implementation of an LSI is a factor that, if not handled carefully, can lead to 
numerous challenges in ensuring that the LSI is performing in the best interests of the 
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Government.  The Government must initiate managerial processes to cover the 
substantial scope of work the LSI is intended to perform.  The Government must 
implement procedures that would dissuade the LSI from letting an OCI affect its 
judgment.  Such procedures can be financial incentives based on firm metrics that tie into 
successful performance outcomes.  Other procedures can be the auditing of LSI activities 
by independent groups to ensure information integrity in program reporting documents.  
The Government must take a proactive approach in managing the LSI’s activities if it 
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III. ARMY FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS 
A. BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide both an in-depth explanation of the 
Army’s FCS, including its systems and history, as well as a conceptual understanding of 
the Army’s massive modernization program.  This chapter will present background 
information to support an analysis of the program’s use of the Lead Systems Integrator 
concept.  To perform an objective analysis of FCS’s contractual procedures, it is 
necessary to understand the complex characteristics of the program.   
1. Concept 
The FCS will change the way the Army equips itself to fight U.S. adversaries.  
The Army has recognized that it needs to transform itself to conduct “full spectrum 
operations” (Fetterman and Plushnik 7).  This transformation has already begun in the 
modularization process of Army units into Brigade Combat Teams (BCT).  The Brigade 
Combat Team is a brigade-sized element that has the ability to deploy with its own 
organic maneuver, fire support, and logistical assets in order to fight our nation’s wars.  
The Army’s FCS is the equipment portion of this transformation.  It will provide 
networked systems that are adaptable to “traditional warfare as well as complex, irregular 
warfare in urban terrains, mixed terrains such as deserts and plains, and restrictive 
terrains such as mountains and jungles” (Fetterman and Plushnik 2). The Army describes 
the program as the most complex acquisition in its history because it involves developing 
and integrating a family of 16 different systems, including a complex information 
network. (Francis, “Role of the Lead Systems Integrator”) 
2. History of the Future Combat Systems 
The Army’s FCS stems from the original initiative of former Army Chief of Staff 
General Eric Shinseki in 1999.   He outlined his vision for transforming the Army forces 
into more lightweight, lethal and survivable units capable of performing full-spectrum 
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operations by 2010.  General Shinseki termed this initiative “Objective Force,” and the 
immediate interim solution became the Stryker BCT. (Flood)   The Stryker BCT was a 
near-term solution force in lieu of the overall vision of the Future Combat Systems.  The 
Stryker BCT is a unit based around the Stryker family of vehicles, lightly armored 
combat vehicles that are intended to move troops around the battlefield securely.  This 
interim solution would set the requirements for a common chassis vehicle that was 
deployable from a C-130 aircraft, a requirement that would later be applied to all manned 
ground vehicles in the FCS program. 
General Shinseki’s Objective Force evolved into the Army’s Future Combat 
Systems.    The Army and the DoD’s central research and development agency, Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), developed a partnership in 2000 for the 
purposes of developing the FCS concept.  The Army and DARPA evaluated four 
contractor teams’ Army FCS conceptual design for applicability with General Shinseki’s 
Objective Force vision. The results of these four teams’ studies were analyzed and 
developed into FCS component systems.     
B. FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS 
FCS consists of numerous manned and unmanned ground vehicular weapon 
systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, sensors, and a complex network through which all of 
these systems will interact.  The benefit of the complex communication network is that 
all members of the network have access to information when they need it and can change 
their course of action as the situation evolves. This gives battle commanders accurate 
situational awareness to make better decisions regarding their battle tactics and leaders 
the edge in making decisive strikes to win battles.  The current configuration of the FCS 
system has 14 individually manned and unmanned systems within the network. The 
Soldier and the communication network are considered to be two additional systems; 
thus, it is dubbed “14+1+1” (Fetterman).  Figure 1 shows all the systems in the FCS.  
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Figure 1.   FCS Systems 
(From Fetterman) 
 
1. The Soldier 
The Soldier is an essential part of the FCS and is treated as a discrete system 
within the program.  The design and implementation of both the different platforms and 
communication architecture of the FCS are centered on the Soldiers’ ability to operate the 
numerous FCS systems. 
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2. Communications 
Communications have always played a vital role in military engagements. 
Knowledge of enemy-friendly locations and activities, combined with the ability to 
command and control, can enable the commander to shift resources and firepower when 
needed at critical points in the battle. The Army’s FCS network consists of five layers 
that provide an integrated platform the commander can use: standards layer, transport 
layer, services layer, applications layer, and networked logistics systems (Department of 
the Army, “Network”).  Figure 2 contains an illustrative description of the FCS network. 
 
Figure 2.   FCS Network (From Department of the Army, “Network”) 
 
 23
The base layer of the FCS network is the Standards Layer, the key feature of 
which is that it allows interoperability between all other users. A simple analogy for this 
is the computer: There are many different types of computers running on different types 
of hardware and operating systems. If an operator wants these different types of computer 
systems to be able to talk to one another, he needs a common interface on the network; if 
no such interface exists, data sent from one machine, say an Apple, could not be 
interpreted by a UNIX box.  
The Transport Layer can receive, decrypt and then transmit information in real-
time to any other node on the FCS network. This layer provides integrated security for all 
information within the FCS communication systems to include the Joint Tactical Radio 
System (JTRS) and Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T). The Transport 
Layer goes further by utilizing state of the industry technology found in commercial 
platforms that allows for real-time responses to network failures. As the network 
encounters failure conditions it begins to assess its communication assets in real-time and 
rearrange network protocols, bandwidth, and connectivity to ensure redundant operation 
and network uptime. (Department of the Army, “Network”) 
The third layer is the Services Layer, which acts in much the same way as an 
operating system. As applications are run on the network of the FCS, the third layer 
handles these input/output requests simultaneously—just as a web server handles 
multiple requests on its servers (Department of the Army, “Network”). The most critical 
role of this layer is the handling of different types of radio frequencies and 
communication services. The ability of Soldiers on the ground to be in direct 
communication with aircraft to request close air support can be as easy as flipping a 
switch.  
The Applications Layer can be seen as the brains of the FCS. It provides 
tomorrow’s commanders with the ability to make better decisions by formulating what 
the best course of action would be with available resources on the battlefield in real-time. 
For example, the application layer can track enemy and allied forces in real-time and 
includes such vital information as the logistical, manpower or fire capability status of 
 24
these forces.  A commander could pull back battle-weakened front-line companies and 
replace them with fully supplied forces.  
The final aspect of the FCS network is the networked logistics system, which it 
should be noted, is the most valuable system within the FCS as nothing like it has ever 
existed before. The networked logistics system allows the commander to shrink his 
logistical footprint by using FCS platforms as sensors and to arrange his logistical needs 
in a way that best suits the mission at hand. The sensors feed the network logistical 
information, let commanders know the location of specific line items, and helps identify 
specific supply shortages in order to prevent critical units from becoming non-mission-
capable. (Department of the Army, “Network”). 
3. Unmanned Vehicles 
The first echelons of unmanned aerial vehicles in the FCS program are termed 
Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. These UAVs provide Soldiers on the ground with a 
valuable reconnaissance tool and target acquisition capabilities. (Department of the 
Army, “Class I UAV”) The Class I UAVs are lightweight and easily deployable in that 
they do not require expert technicians or a large logistical footprint to launch and 
maintain. The Class I UAVs are enhanced by the fact that they could be considered 
“Launch and Forget” platforms in that once they are airborne, the onboard computer can 
take over basic decision-making abilities (such as flight patterns) and can avoid 
hazardous conditions while transmitting valuable information on enemy movements. 
(Department of the Army, “Class I UAV”) 
Class IV UAVs differ from Class I UAVs in that they are more robust and, as 
such, require a higher level of operation training and a larger footprint. Class IV UAVs 
are suitable for Brigade Combat Teams and have increased range and sensory ability. 
(Department of the Army, “Class IV UAV”) 
Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV) are similar in concept to UAVs, with the 




Vehicles (SUGV) can be transported by the Soldier and can perform a variety of 
missions, from searching buildings to clearing an area of booby traps. (Department of the 
Army, “SUGV”)  
Perhaps the most flexible UGV is the Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and 
Equipment (MULE). The MULE can perform a wide range of roles with different 
packages that can be installed by the manufacturer. The MULE can be utilized in three 
roles: counter-mine; reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RST); and 
transport. While each role coincides with a different manufacturer’s package, 
commonality is maintained through each variant by the Common Mobility Platform 
(CMP) design. The CMP is the MULEs’ common design, which establishes the base 
platform for the system with regard to propulsion suspension and navigation capability. 
(Department of the Army, “SUGV”)  
4. Manned Ground Vehicle   
The FCS program’s family of manned ground vehicles includes command-and-
control vehicles, medical vehicles, and infantry fighting vehicles that include both non-
lines-of-sight mortar as well as artillery systems. All vehicles will share a common 
vehicle chassis and will have a substantial amount of common components.  This 
commonality characteristic is intended to lower life cycle maintenance and logistics cost.  
The Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) replaces the Army’s current Bradley Fighting 
Vehicle. In terms of armament, the ICV carries a 30mm cannon as its primary weapon, as 
opposed to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle’s 20mm cannon. The ICV’s real difference from 
the Bradley Fighting Vehicle is its increased communication and network capabilities. As 
the ICV is an interlinked part of the FCS framework, it has a significant advantage with 
respect to command and control of other FCS assets. (Department of the Army, “ICV”)   
 The Mounted Combat System (MCS) is new in that it does not have a direct 
predecessor. It can be thought of as a mixture of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the M1 
Abrams tank. The MCS shares the same basic framework as the ICV, with the addition of 
a 120mm cannon, the same caliber as the M1 Abrams—the U.S. Army’s current main 
battle tank. (Department of the Army, “MCS”) Utilizing similar technologies on the 
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brigade level is the Command and Control Vehicle (C2V). This vehicle, operating within  
a Brigade Combat Team (BCT), can deliver command-and-control capabilities to 
brigade-level elements. The C2V uses the same basic platform as the ICV and MCS, with 
slight modifications. 
5. Unattended Ground Sensors 
The FCS program’s Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) system is intended to 
perform operational tasks such as surveillance, target acquisition, situational awareness 
and perimeter defense.  They are all network-enabled and are able to feed real time 
information to remote operators on the FCS Network.  The two types of UGS are Tactical 
UGS and Urban UGS.   
C. FCS CONTRACT 
The FCS contract was originally an Other Transaction Authority contract awarded 
to the Boeing Company (Boeing) and Science Applications International Corporation 
(SAIC) in March 2002 for the Concept and Technology Development (CTD) Phase of the 
acquisition life cycle.  Boeing and SAIC were designated the LSI for the program, and, 
initially, the LSI approach was “expected to afford opportunities to insert leap-ahead 
technology upgrades, incorporate best business practices, and to ensure an integrated 
effort from all concerned” (Flood 360).  The contract had a price tag of $154 million and 
was expected to last sixteen months.   
1. Other Transaction Authority 
An Other Transaction Authority (OTA) contract is a contractual instrument used 
primarily for development of prototypes directly relevant to weapon systems (Smith, 
Drezner and Lachow 11).  The OTA facilitates Government contractual procedures by 
eliminating the need for federal laws and regulations normally found in traditional 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) procurement contracts.  Such laws and regulations 
tend to deter non-traditional defense contractors from entering into contractual 
negotiations with the Government.  The intent of the OTA contract is to create a 
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consensus between the contractor and the Government as to the applicability of these 
laws and regulations in the contract.  The goals of the OTA contracting method are stated 
below. 
• Improve, streamline and strengthen technology access and development 
programs 
• Encourage open market competition and technology-driven prototype efforts 
• Exploit the cost-reduction potential of innovative or commercially developed 
technology (Yoder 2) 
 
In May 2003, the FCS System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase 
contract was awarded to Boeing under the same OTA agreement used in the CTD phase.  
The SDD phase was expected to last approximately five years, until the production 
decision in November 2008.  The cost of the FCS program at the time was estimated to 
be $79 billion. (Francis, “Future Combat Systems Challenges”) 
 The FCS program has been significantly restructured since the original SDD 
contract was awarded.  In July 2004, the program was restructured in order to reduce the 
risk of an aggressive schedule and the existence of numerous immature technologies.  
The following summarizes the details of the FCS program restructure: 
• Lengthened timeline by four years; new production decision in 2012 
• FCS Spin-Outs initiated 
• Increased cost of SDD contract by $6.1 billion 
2. FCS Spin Outs 
The Army identified several of the matured technologies developed in the FCS 
program as being critical to the success of the program, as well as essential to the current 
force.  The development of these technologies was accelerated in the FCS Spin-Out in 
order to infuse these new developments into the current Army force earlier and, thus, 
 28
enhance the Army’s capabilities and test the effectiveness of these technologies.  The 
FCS Spin-Outs will happen in three phases, each separated by two years.  
• FCS Spin-out 1: Initiate testing in Fiscal Year 2008, consisting of Network 
Capability Integration Kits for Bradley Fighting Vehicle, M-1 Abrams 
battle tank, and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
(HMMWV) platforms, Unattended Urban and Tactical Ground Sensors, 
and the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System. 
• FCS Spin-out 2: Initiate testing in Fiscal Year 2010 of the program’s 
active vehicle protection systems and platoon- and brigade-level 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). 
• FCS Spin-out 3: Initiate testing in Fiscal Year 2012 of core program 
events. Spin-out will consist of ground robots to complement the Small 
Unmanned Ground Vehicles, Class IV UAV, and Controller Unit FCS 
Battle Command, which is a replacement of the current Army Battle 
Command System. (Fetterman 5) 
In April 2005, the Army was ordered by the Chief of Staff to restructure the 
existing OTA contract for FCS into a FAR-based contract protected by federal laws and 
regulations.  In September, a new FAR-based cost plus fixed fee/cost plus incentive fee 
contract was awarded to Boeing, which retained the LSI duties (Francis, “Role of the 
Lead Systems Integrator”) 
.   
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IV. COAST GUARD DEEPWATER PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide the reader with an in-depth background of the Coast 
Guard Integrated Deepwater System (Deepwater) program.  This information is 
necessary to understand why the Coast Guard initiated Deepwater.  The chapter will also 
provide insight into the Coast Guard’s decision to use a LSI for this complex acquisition 
program.  
B. THE DEEPWATER CONCEPT 
The Deepwater program is designed to enhance the deepwater capabilities of the 
Coast Guard.  These deepwater capabilities span from boats, to aircraft, to unmanned 
vehicles’ abilities to “enforce fisheries laws, intercept drug smugglers and illegal 
immigrants, and conduct search and rescue missions far out at sea” (Hecker 5). The 
Deepwater program looks to enhance these capabilities by acquiring new equipment or 
remodeling or refitting existing equipment in the Coast Guard inventory. The Deepwater 
program is the largest acquisition program for the Coast Guard to date.   
C. HISTORY OF THE DEEPWATER SYSTEM 
In the early 1990s, the Coast Guard faced a significant challenge to its ability to 
perform its mission to protect U.S. maritime borders, particularly in further-from-shore, 
deepwater operations.  The challenge stemmed from the Coast Guard’s reliance on near-
obsolete equipment and technologies to perform deepwater missions.  This equipment 
consisted of deepwater cutters, aircraft, and command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets.  Most of these 
assets relied on antiquated technology and were reaching the later years of their service 
life. 
The deepwater cutters had been in service for more than thirty years and were so 
antiquated that system and component manufacturers had cancelled the production and 
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repair of equipment and parts for the cutters.  The age and design of the cutters have 
prevented the integration of current technologies that automate shipboard systems and 
minimize maintenance.  The maintenance challenges of the cutters have increased 
associated operations and support costs and, consequently, have reduced operational 
availability of the cutters.   
The Coast Guard aircraft were limited in performance given their inadequate 
night operations capability and sensor equipment.  There was also poor interoperability 
between the aircraft and cutters, which left each platform to perform without the support 
of the other.  The C4ISR capability was limited due to inadequate communication and an 
inability to implement technological advances onto existing platforms.   
The Deepwater program was initiated in 1997, and after exhaustive analysis of 
current assets by the Coast Guard and private contractors, the following systems were 
identified for procurement under the Deepwater program.   
Ships, boats, and surface craft: 
• 8 new National Security Cutters, or NSCs, displacing about 4,000 
tons each (i.e., ships analogous to today’s high-endurance cutters) 
• 25 new Offshore Patrol Cutters, or OPCs, displacing about 3,200 
tons each (i.e., ships analogous to today’s medium-endurance 
cutters) 
• 58 new Fast-Response Cutters (FRCs), displacing 200 tons each 
• 33 new Long-range Interceptor (LRI) craft, displacing 15 tons each 
• 91 new Short-range Prosecutor (SRP) craft, displacing 9 tons each. 
 
Aircraft: 
• 6 missionized HC-130J and 16 converted HC-130H Long-range 
Search (LRS) aircraft 
• 36 new HC-144A Medium-range Surveillance (MRS) Maritime Patrol 
Aircraft  
based on the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company 
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(EADS) CASA HC-235 Persuader MPA aircraft design 
• 42 converted HH-60J Medium-range Recovery (MRR) helicopters 
• 95 converted HH-65C Multi-mission Cutter Helicopters (MCHs) 
 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 
• 45 new HV911 Vertical Takeoff and Landing UAVs (VUAV) 
• 4 leased RQ-4A Global Hawk High Altitude Endurance UAVs 
(HAEUAVs) (O’Rourke 5) 
 
In addition to these systems, the Deepwater program also includes the conversion 
of 49 Island-class patrol boats to be upgraded from 100 ft to 123 ft in order to remain in 
service until Deepwater is complete.  
Indeed, the Deepwater program is much like the Army’s FCS in that it is keeping 
with the historical strategy of western warfare to fully utilize science and technology to 
enhance our military’s fighting power. Deepwater facilitates the Coast Guard’s natural 
evolution with the latest information technology and weapons platforms to perform its 
various missions in defense of the United States. Figure 3 illustrates the Coast Guard 




Figure 3.   Deepwater Systems 
(From Integrated Coast Guard Systems 1) 
 
D. DEEPWATER SYSTEMS 
1. National Security Cutter 
The largest-scale vessel in Figure 3 is the National Security Cutter (NSC). The 
NSC is an integral component of the Deepwater system, with capabilities far surpassing 
those of its predecessors. The program includes eight Legend-class cutters to replace the 
Coast Guard’s aging fleet of Hamilton-class cutters. The new NSC is 125.3m long 
(10.3m longer than its predecessor) and has a range of 22,000km with a sustained 
duration of 60 days (Glassborow). The NSC also features a wide array of sensors capable 
of detecting chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. It is further enhanced by its 
capability to support HH-60 helicopters and a stern launch for small boats, enabling the 
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NSC to insert teams when necessary. The NSC is not without its own offensive 
capabilities, armed with a MK 110 57mm gun, which was selected in order to maintain 
commonality with U.S. Navy weapon systems. (Glassborow) These integrated systems 
and unique command-and-control capabilities make the NCS a key component of the 
Deepwater system. 
2. Fast Response Cutter  
The Fast-Response Cutter (FRC) is the next lower echelon of cutters that are to 
replace the Island Class of cutters. The FRC features one 25mm stabilized gun with 
infrared sensors and four 12.7mm machine guns with a range of ten nautical miles—all 
powered by two 3,650-horsepower diesel engines. The FRC also possesses the ability to 
launch a Short-range Interceptor vessel (SRI). (Jane's Information Group 19 June 2007) 
3. Aviation  
As mentioned previously, one of the greatest assets of the Coast Guard is its 
aviation equipment. When aviation was introduced to the Coast Guard, it greatly aided 
search-and-rescue missions. Lately, aviation has played critical roles in drug interdiction, 
reconnaissance, and the neutralization of a variety of threats in our nation’s water ways.  
The aviation assets of the Coast Guard have been further enhanced by the Deepwater 
program.  One of the Deepwater systems is an integrated vertical takeoff UAV system 
that can be launched from sea-borne platforms.  
At the heart of the Deepwater system aviation is the HC-144A, otherwise known 
as the Medium-range Surveillance Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MRS). The MRS’s features 
include the EADS CASA Fully Integrated Tactical System (FITS) that enables the 
aircraft to use the system-of-systems network within the Deepwater framework. 
Additional MRS features include a multiple-mode radar search system, infrared sensors, 
and larger observation windows. This vast array of sensory technology serves as the eyes 
of the Coast Guard fleet; by feeding valuable information through its FITS in nearly all 
possible weather conditions, the Coast Guard is able to carry out its missions 365 days a 
year. The MRS can also be easily reconfigured (due to its modular design) to serve as 
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either a personnel or a cargo transport. (Jane's Information Group) These additional 
configurations allow the HC-144A to play key roles as situations change; for instance, it 
can provide relief aid to hurricane victims and enable the quick evacuation of civilian 
personnel in the event of a major catastrophe.  
The second major aviation asset to the Deepwater system is the Multi-mission 
Cutter helicopter (MCH), designated MH-65C. The MCH may be seen as the workhorse 
of Coast Guard operations. Its vertical take-off and landing capability provides quick 
response times to search-and-rescue operations or drug or terrorist interdiction. The MCH 
has a range of 400 nautical miles, with a top speed of 160 knots and an endurance of four 
hours. Its crew consists of two officers and one enlisted personnel. The weapon system 
on this platform consists of .50 caliber precision fire weapons and a M242 .60 caliber 
machine gun (Truver and Bull). 
4. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles  
The purpose of the VUAV, the smaller class of UAV in the Deepwater program, 
is to receive Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive Detection and 
Defense (CBR D&D) information in order to allow increased detection and monitoring 
capability.  The VUAV is designed to launch from the Deepwater cutters’ flight deck.  
The VUAV radar can operate in air-to-air and air-to-surface modes to allow for increased 
awareness in the Coast Guard’s Common Operational Picture (COP) (Tousley).   
The HAEUAV is a leased system that will incorporate a sophisticated suite of 
radars and infrared cameras to improve the Coast Guard’s COP.  It is a larger UAV than 
the VUAV, with a more complex sensor capability (Tousley).    
E. DEEPWATER CONTRACT 
In August 1998, the Coast Guard awarded three $1 million dollar contracts to 
three teams of contractors for the concept development phase of the Deepwater program.  
Similar to the Army with the FCS program, the Coast Guard relied on private industry to 
develop the solution for its Deepwater capability needs.  Based on an evaluation of all 
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contractors’ designs for the Deepwater program, the Coast Guard selected one contractor 
team to proceed to the second phase of the acquisition process.  
In June 2002, the Coast Guard awarded the Deepwater contract to the joint 
venture team Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS).  ICGS is a teaming of two major 
defense contractor firms: Lockheed Martin and Northrup Grumman.  The contract was 
originally established for five-year terms; at an estimated cost of $14 billion, the entire 
program would have taken twenty years to complete. (Woods)  This contract was for the 
program’s second phase of the acquisition cycle, which is similar to the DoD’s 
understanding of the development and production phases of a program.  The terms of the 
contract dictated that the program must come under review and re-competition every five 
years.  The contract itself was an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity, cost plus award 
fee contract with award fees every five years throughout the life of the contract. 
(Caldwell)     
Since Coast Guard leadership awarded the contract to ICGS, Deepwater has 
undergone significant changes and experienced certain drawbacks in the areas of cost, 
schedule and performance.  The most significant of these changes came after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, when the Coast Guard took on additional homeland security 
missions and, therefore, had to revise the Deepwater contract to reflect these missions 
(Caldwell 84).  In March 2005, the effects of the Coast Guard’s increased responsibilities 
led to an increase in the estimated cost of the program, from $14 to $24 billion, and 
extended the program from 20 to 25 years.  The majority of the cost increase was due to 
changes in the original mission requirements for the Deepwater program, adding 
capability to the original Deepwater assets to reflect additional Homeland Security 
missions.  This revision to the Deepwater program led to increased scrutiny of the 
management of the program by Congressional agencies concerned about the increased 
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V. LEAD SYSTEMS INTEGRATOR IMPLEMENTATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The authority of the LSI is considerable within the scope of the FCS and 
Deepwater programs.  The second chapter addressed the importance of information 
integrity, potential OCIs, and how the LSI may exercise its authority in opposition to the 
Government’s interests.  Subcontractor management practices and the Integrated Product 
Team (IPT) managerial structure of the FCS and Deepwater contracts show the amount 
of authority the Government gives the LSIs in each program.  The consequences of 
ceding this authority to the LSI can be measured by the cost, schedule and performance 
metrics of the programs.  This chapter provides the contractual statements that outline the 
managerial power of the LSI and summarizes cost, schedule and performance metrics 
that can measure the effectiveness of a LSI.   
B. INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAMS 
The main managerial method used in the Government acquisition force today is 
the Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD).  A definition of IPPD is 
provided by the Defense Acquisition University: 
A management technique that simultaneously integrates all essential 
acquisition activities through the use of multidisciplinary teams to 
optimize the design, manufacturing, and supportability processes. IPPD 
facilitates meeting cost and performance objectives from product concept 
through production, including field support. One of the key IPPD tenets is 
multidisciplinary teamwork through Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). 
(Defense Acquisition University 1) 
The FCS and Deepwater contracts address the use of IPTs and describe both the 
managerial structure of the programs and how the LSI will operate within that structure. 
The following statement from the FCS contract establishes the authority held by a 
LSI as a Program Manager (PM) in the IPPD process: “The LSI will lead each IPT, 
regardless of IPT level, with the Government providing appropriate co-leaders unless the 
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PM, UA and the PM, LSI agree otherwise” (Walter 62).  The PM Unit of Action (UA) is 
the Government program manager established to ensure that all key Government 
stakeholders are represented within the IPT where appropriate.  The PM LSI is the 
Boeing Program Manager that exercises system integration responsibilities and represents 
the LSI in each IPT. 
This structure of IPT leadership—with the LSI as the leader of the IPT and also as 
a member—makes for possible conflicts of interest. The previously quoted passage can 
be interpreted to mean that the LSI is over-represented in the IPPD process.  The 
authority delegated to the LSI is further delineated in the “IPT Resolution” process 
portions of the contract, where it states:  “The final decision-making authority for an 
issue raised by this procedure will be the Program Manager, LSI” (Walter 63). 
Similarly, the Deepwater contract also gives managerial authority to the LSI, 
ICGS.  The following quote was taken from the Deepwater contract in reference to the 
conduct of IPPD within the program: “The Contractor’s team members shall be delegated 
the responsibility, authority, and accountability for decision-making and management 
actions necessary, at the most appropriate location, for successful performance of the 
contract” (U.S. Coast Guard 38-7). 
The IPT managerial structure is further delineated by the following contract 
statement: “The Contractor shall provide overall direction and guidance, track progress 
and status, resolve conflicts, and integrate products and services provided by 
subcontractors/vendors with the products and services provided by the Contractor” (U.S. 
Coast Guard 38-7). 
Consequently, as a result of this managerial structure, some concerns and 
conflicts involving subcontractors may not reach the Government.  The IPT structure was 
not set up to allow the entity providing the capability to voice his or her concerns, but, 
rather, to allow the LSI contractor to be a filter for these concerns. 
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C. SUBCONTRACTOR MANAGEMENT 
One LSI responsibility in the FCS and Deepwater programs is subcontractor 
management.  The LSI, ideally, does not perform much of the work in the program on its 
own, but manages the work of the subcontractors in order to ensure proper integration.  
The contracts for both Deepwater and FCS give the LSI significant power over its 
subcontractors and limit the Government’s power to influence subcontractor decisions.    
The managerial structure outlined in the FCS contract relies heavily on the LSI to 
provide management and leadership for the program.  The Government does assert its 
influence on managerial decisions by mandating that co-chairs for the IPTs must be 
strictly Government personnel.  However, the Government loses the ability to influence 
the program because of the restriction placed on the interaction with Boeing’s 
subcontractors.  The contract dictates: “The parties agree that Government members of an 
IPT do not have the authority to, and therefore shall not, direct the efforts of Boeing 
subcontractors, regardless of tier” (Walter 62). 
The FCS contract is structured so that the subcontractors do the majority of the 
work for the program.  The LSI holds only a managerial role in the program. Therefore, 
performance decisions in the IPTs should be focused on the performance of the 
subcontractors. These subcontractors are not required to consider the recommendations of 
Government representatives in the IPTs.  The LSI is the only managing body that has 
influential power over the subcontractors; therefore, it is the only entity with influence 
over program performance. 
The FCS contract addresses the possibility of conflicts of interests with the LSI 
and what measures are in place to mitigate these potential conflicts.  The contract states 
that the LSI is not permitted to compete for any work under the contract at any tier. 
(Walter 64)  It maintains that the LSI should not have any advantage in source selection, 
with the potential of awarding a contract to itself.  The contract also states that the LSI 
will enter into written agreements with subcontractors regarding the disclosure of 
proprietary information. (Walter 65) One key aspect that does not comply with these 
conflict of interest statements is the aspect of the FCS program that applies to all systems: 
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the network.  Boeing does have the responsibility for developing the FCS network.  The 
breadth of the work for the FCS network is software-intensive and involves interfacing 
with multiple systems that the subcontractors, not the LSI, are developing.  This could 
potentially create a conflict of interest because Boeing can use the proprietary 
information in the software code for the systems to build the network (Walter).  The 
conflicts of interests clause works to prevent the LSI from awarding subcontracts to itself 
and to protect proprietary information of the subcontractor. However, the actual 
implementation of the FCS network aspect of the program proves quite the opposite.  
The Deepwater contract allows Government surveillance of subcontractor 
activities in order for the Coast Guard to assess performance and to ensure that the 
objectives of the program are being met (U.S. Coast Guard, 10).  The Government plays 
more of an active role in contract quality assurance in the Deepwater program than in the 
FCS contract.  This active role ensures that the subcontractors do not remain solely under 
the control of the LSI, and the Government has more access to the actions and progress of 
the subcontractors.  However, the ineffectiveness of this contractual language is evident 
in the recent performance shortfalls in Deepwater. 
In a scathing 2007 report to Congress regarding the Coast Guard’s Deepwater 
program, one researcher found that the Coast Guard did not possess the needed 
acquisition personnel or experience to manage Deepwater.  
Observers have also expressed concern that the Coast Guard does not have 
enough in-house staff and in-house expertise in areas such as program 
management, financial management, and system integration, to properly 
oversee and manage an acquisition effort as large and complex as the 
Deepwater program. (O’Rourke 11)  
The Coast Guard could not successfully oversee an LSI without changes in its 
acquisition practices, organizational structure, management, and decision-making 
processes. (O’Rourke) Instead of keeping informed of the subcontractors’ progress and 
performance, the Coast Guard chose to delegate this role to the LSI. “Conversely, the 
Coast Guard chose to limit the technical oversight role of the Systems Directorate on 
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Deepwater to providing ‘expertise and credible advice in core integrated engineering  
and logistics competencies’.” (O'Rourke 44) 
D. COST 
As both programs have progressed in the development phase of their contracts, 
their costs have risen at alarming rates.  Certain aspects of these cost increases can be 
attributed to mismanagement.  One of the key aspects of program management is 
managing any costs to the Government.  Since the LSI holds significant management 
authority for each program, the considerable cost increases in the program could be 
attributed to its managerial ineffectiveness in cost control.   
The NSC is an example of a project within Deepwater that has had a considerable 
cost increase, nearly 50 percent.  The original cost estimate for the NSC was $775 
million; however, this figure is expected to increase to as much as $1.07 billion due to 
structural deficiencies in the design of the NSC. (O'Rourke 17)  These structural 
deficiencies were not detected in the IPT led by the LSI, due in large part to the inability 
of the IPT to collaborate and finalize engineering change proposals. (Caldwell)  
The VUAV was scheduled for delivery in 2013. However, the Coast Guard has 
issued the contractor a stop-work order for the VUAV due to the immaturity of the 
system’s technology. (Caldwell) The total cost of the VUAV was estimated at $503.3 
million.  This cost will now likely increase when the stop-work order is cancelled or an 
alternative approach to the VUAV capability is pursued in the future.  The IPT failed to 
provide a proper assessment of the system’s technology in order for the Coast Guard to 
make adequate funding decisions for the project.  The LSI is the IPT leader, and the LSI’s 
inability to assess a project’s technology is a clear sign of poor managerial skills. 
The total cost of Deepwater is now estimated at $24 billion, a substantial increase 
over the original estimate of $17 billion made in 2003.  The Coast Guard contends that 
the majority of this increase is due to the expanded responsibilities placed on its 
Deepwater capabilities within its recent re-alignment under the DHS from the 
Department of Transportation (DT). (Caldwell)  This statement may be accurate;   
however, the distribution of those funds within ICGS raises concerns about the LSI cost-
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control methods.  An important factor in controlling an acquisition program’s cost is the 
existence of competition.  One of the most important tests for reasonableness when 
considering the cost of a contract is competition. 
The previous chapter explained that one of the reasons for choosing an LSI would 
be to take advantage of private industry competition.  The Coast Guard fully intended for 
the LSI to control costs by encouraging fair and open competition. However, the LSI 
awarded a substantial portion of the work to itself.  The power given to the LSI in the 
Deepwater contract allowed the LSI to conduct the “make vs. buy” decisions without the 
input of the Coast Guard.  Coast Guard officials said that the systems integrator was hired 
to make those decisions because the service lacked the expertise to make it. (Woods) 
The following charts depict the amount of obligated funds the LSI (first-tier 
subcontractor) has given to itself or ICGS affiliated companies in the Deepwater 
program. 
 
Figure 4.   Breakdown of the Percentage of ICGS Obligations to First-tier 
Subcontractors (Includes Planned Subcontractors) 
(Walker 50) 
 
According to this figure, approximately 50 percent of all Deepwater funds have 
gone to ICGS.  As of December 2006, the total amount of funds obligated to the program 
was $1.6 billion.  The excessive amount of work that the LSI has not subcontracted out 
calls into question the methods the LSI used to ensure that private industry competition 
provided the best value for the customer.    
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The current contract the Army has with the LSI is for the SDD phase of the FCS 
program. It is estimated at $17.5 billion and is a cost-plus-fixed-fee and cost-plus-
incentive-fee contract.  The fee structure of the contract allows for the LSI to earn a 
substantial portion of its fees prior to capability demonstration of the FCS program.  The 
fixed fee is paid to the LSI for successful completion of an event.  The purpose of the 
incentive fee is to reward the LSI for achieving cost control and performance goals tied to 
that event.  
The cost portion of the contract is approximately $15.2 billion, with the remaining 
15 percent ($2.3 billion) consisting of incentive and fixed fees.  These fees can be 80-
percent realized by the LSI by the Critical Design Review (CDR).  The CDR is scheduled 
for 2011, and the demonstration of individual FCS prototypes and the system-of-systems 
will happen after the CDR (Francis, “Role of the Lead Systems Integrator”).  Typically, 
most cost growth occurs after the CDR during performance demonstrations.  The cost 
growth is attributed to design flaws typically being discovered in the building and testing 
of prototypes that normally occur after the CDR.  The LSI can potentially earn about 
$1.84 billion in event and performance-based fees and still not demonstrate any FCS 
program performance.  This fee structure calls to question the procedures the Army uses 
to incentivize the LSI for providing capability.   
The compositions of the fees, as well as the events tied to them, are outlined in 




Figure 5.   Fee Events and Schedule for FCS Contract 
(Francis, From “Role of the Lead Systems Integrator” 22) 
As indicated in the preceding chart, over 80 percent of the incentive and fixed 
fees for the FCS contract will be paid to the LSI by the CDR. 
The distribution of incentive fees in the FCS program for each program event 
does not encourage the LSI to meet the requirements to receive those fees.   The incentive 
fee structure allows for the unused incentive fee funds to be rolled over to subsequent 
events in order to use the money to incentivize the LSI.  If the LSI fails to meet the cost 
or performance objectives of the incentive fee, then it can recoup the remaining funds 
later. (Francis, “Role of the Lead Systems Integrator”) This undercuts the original intent 
of the incentive fee, which was to provide motivation for the contractor to meet cost, 
schedule and performance metrics tied to an event. Under this procedure, the LSI does 
not have to meet cost control and performance metrics for an event within a given time 
because it can recoup the fee later.   
 45
The initial cost estimates of the total FCS program were approximately $77.2 
billion.  By 2005, this cost had grown to approximately $119.2 billion, which the Army 
contends is due in large part to the restructuring of the FCS contract from an OTA 
contract to a Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)-based, cost-plus-fixed-fee/cost-plus-
incentive-fee contract, as well as to the decision to produce certain FCS capabilities 
earlier in the FCS Spin-outs.  However, the cost of the program continued to rise in 2006, 
with independent agencies estimating it to be $150.5 billion.  The Army states that the 
total costs of the FCS program are now $163 billion.  The total costs for the FCS program 
keep increasing as the program supposedly gets more mature; however, the LSI, thus far, 
is recouping most of its costs for the development phase prior to demonstrating 
capabilities, and is earning incentive fees for cost control, although the total costs of the 
program keeps rising.  
E. SCHEDULE 
The LSI’s effectiveness can be measured in this research by cost, schedule and 
performance. Perhaps the most important metric with DoD and DHS programs is 
schedule.  A high-performance, cost-effective solution will not adequately meet mission 
requirements if it cannot be delivered to the war fighter in a timely manner.  
In October, 2007, the Deepwater program encountered a setback to its schedule 
with the VUAV vertical unmanned aerial vehicle. The VUAV platform’s schedule was 
halted altogether after technology assessments concluded that the technology maturity of 
the VUAV was unproven (Caldwell).  The original delivery year for the VUAV was 
2006. However, now the Coast Guard has halted funding and all action on the VUAV 
until at least fiscal year 2013.  This schedule change could have negative effects on the 
capabilities of the NSC because the VUAV was originally scheduled to be delivered with 
the NSC to provide surveillance capabilities.  The LSI did not make an adequate 
assessment of the technology and has failed to set a realistic schedule to reflect the level 
of technology maturity in the VUAV. 
The original time to delivery of the Deepwater assets was twenty years.  After the 
Deepwater program’s revision in 2005, an additional five years were added to the 
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timetable.  Much of the schedule changes in the revision are attributed to changes in the 
scope of requirements with the realignment of the Coast Guard under the DHS.  The 
schedule since 2005 has continued to slip for certain assets, due in large part to 
inefficiencies in design and integrations.  The following figure depicts the schedule status 
of each Deepwater asset with respect to previous year’s schedule estimates.   
 
Figure 6.   Comparison of 2005 and 2006 Estimated Delivery Dates for the First-in-
Class Deepwater Assets 
(From Caldwell 34) 
According to the figure, four Deepwater assets will not make their intended first-
in-class delivery date.  This schedule slippage can be attributed to the LSI’s poor 
management in the design and development of Deepwater assets. It should have little to 
do with the Deepwater program revision of 2005.   
The schedule conflicts within the FCS program are difficult to attribute solely to 
the LSI because there are relatively few assets that have gone through production—and 
the program is still in the SDD phase, with a CDR approaching in 2011.  The results of 
the CDR will be able to show the effectiveness of the LSI in the development of FCS.  
The contract restructure into a FAR-based contract in September 2005 can be used as an 
example of how ineffective the LSI was in accomplishing the goals that justified the use 
of an LSI in the first place.  
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The original schedule for the FCS program development was aggressive. The 
schedule called for three years in development, with production beginning in 2006 and 
initial operating capability being achieved in 2008.  The way the Army attempted to 
mitigate the increased risk in the short schedule was by utilizing a LSI to infuse private- 
industry best-business practices into a system-of-systems acquisition.  The LSI was 
supposed to be a partner to the Army in refining requirements and technology 
assessments.  The LSI failed to provide the Army with the required expertise to assess the 
FCS suitable for entry into the SDD phase of acquisition.  As a result, the Army had to 
restructure the program and add four additional years to the overall schedule in order to 
accommodate the lack of requirement definition and technology maturity.  The current 
FCS schedule is depicted in the figure below.   
 
Figure 7.   Key Events in FCS Program’s Acquisition 
(Francis, From “Role of the Lead Systems Integrator” 6) 
The figure shows that the FCS program will not enter into Low-rate Initial 
Production until 2012, which is significantly beyond the original estimate of 2006.  There 
are many factors that contribute to this considerable schedule increase; however, it is 
important to note that the reason the LSI was pursued was to help handle the initial 
aggressive schedule of the FCS.  The LSI did not perform its duties as a program 
manager adequately, in that it did not advise the Army on the immaturity of technologies 
or the ill-defined requirements of the FCS system-of-systems architecture.   
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F. PERFORMANCE 
The Coast Guard suffered additional schedule delays in the highly publicized 
NSC failures. The reason for the NSC’s delay was the design flaws of the vessel. These 
design flaws could have been addressed in 2002 when they were first discovered, which 
may have enabled the program to stay on track. But failure of the LSI to properly manage 
these concerns has led to failure. One researcher remarks: 
The Coast Guard's technical experts first identified and presented their 
concerns about NSC's structural design to senior Deepwater program 
management in December 2002, but this did not dissuade the Coast Guard 
from authorizing production of the NSC in June 2004 or from awarding 
ICGS [the Integrated Coast Guard Systems] a contract extension in May 
2006. (Fein 1) 
The structural deficiencies prevented the vessel from being deployed for its 
required duration of 230 days in the operational environment for which it was designed.  
These design flaws are expected to increase the program’s cost, the maintenance cost, 
and the subsequent lifecycle cost (O’Rourke).  
The LSI’s failure to meet contractual requirements by providing oversight and 
seamless integration of systems resulted in numerous performance issues for Deepwater. 
On February 10, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security received a complaint to the 
Inspectors General’s Office alleging that the 123’ Island-Class Patrol boats had numerous 
safety and security flaws that were being ignored by the contractor and overlooked by the 
LSI (O’Rourke). The complaint further stated how this individual had tried 
unsuccessfully for two-and-a-half years to resolve the problem by informing the 
contractor and bringing it to the attention of the LSI. It was clear, upon a formal review, 
that the contractor’s failure to comply with design requirements had led to the following: 
• The safety of the 123’ cutter’s crew was compromised by the contractor’s 
failure to utilize low-smoke cabling. 
• The contractor knowingly installed aboard the 123’ cutter and prosecutor 
external C4ISR equipment that did not meet specific environmental 
requirements outlined in the Deepwater contract. 
• The cable installed during the upgrade to the cutter’s C4ISR system 
represented a security vulnerability.   
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• The video surveillance system installed aboard the 123’ cutter did not 
meet the cutter’s physical security requirements. (O’Rourke 46) 
The allegations stated that the contractors knew that these shortcomings were in 
violation of the contract but deliberately ignored contractual language and appeals by the 
plaintiff citing safety concerns for the cutter’s crew.  These actions have caused the 123’ 
Island-Class Patrol Boats project to be suspended after eight boats have been delivered.  
The remaining eight boats have been decommissioned, and the Fast-Response Cutter 
(FRC) schedule has been accelerated to fill the capability gap produced by this 
suspension.  This performance shortfall can be attributed to the LSI not performing the 
necessary managerial steps in overseeing design functions.   
The original Deepwater contract mandated a 20-year program that had a cost of 
over $17 billion dollars. After revisions to the original program schedule due to the 
events of September 11 and the added mission requirements placed on the Coast Guard, 
the Deepwater program added an additional five years to its original schedule. The 
original schedule has suffered many additional delays due to lack of oversight within 
Deepwater (such as the national security cutter, vertical take-off and landing unmanned 
aerial vehicles, and cutter vessels). The lack of managerial oversight and integration by 
the Deepwater LSI has contributed to the overall program schedule slippage and can be 
tied to future schedule overruns of the program. 
The performance shortfalls of ICGS can be illustrated through the failures of the 
patrol boat modernization program as it attempted to lengthen the hull.  The Deepwater 
program required the lengthening of the Coast Guard’s 110’ patrol boat to 123’ in order 
to meet its new post-9/11 requirements. The design and implementation of changes that 
required the cutters to meet these additional requirements was poorly managed.  The 
patrol boats suffered numerous structural design failures that resulted in eight of the boats 
being decommissioned. The remaining equipment on these boats was salvaged to be used 
on other Coast Guard equipment (O’Rourke).  The failure of the patrol boat 
modernization reflected the failure of the LSI to correctly manage contractors, integrate 
technologies, and provide the necessary oversight in a system-of-systems program. These 
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performance shortfalls adversely affected cost, as they wasted money when the  
required cutters were not delivered on schedule. 
The Fast Response Cutter (FRC) program was accelerated due to the failure of the 
patrol boat modernization design. The construction effort of the FRC was sped up by ten 
years. However, design features in the FRC were problematic, and the Coast Guard had 
to cancel the work on design. (O’Rourke)  This cancellation led to the FRC being divided 
into an FRC-A and an FRC-B, where the B-class would be similar in design to the patrol 
boat, and the A-class would have a new design.  The FRC-B will be built by a company 
that is not associated with the ICGS.  
The Army and the LSI work collaboratively on refining requirements to fit within 
the overall performance specification of a system-of-systems.  This requirements analysis 
has resulted in some changes to operational requirements in the FCS system.  One such 
operational requirement is the transportability of the manned ground vehicular system.  
The original operational requirement mandated the weight of the FCS manned ground 
vehicle to be within transportability standards of a C-130 aircraft (approximately 24 
tons).  The requirements refinement showed that the advanced armor for the systems did 
not prove to be effective within the weight parameters. (Francis, “Role of the Lead 
Systems Integrator”) The operational requirement was, consequently, altered to 
incorporate a 29-ton weight requirement, which changes the transportation capability to a 
C-17 aircraft.   
The Army has absolved the LSI of many of the cost, schedule and performance 
shortfalls of the FCS program.  The Army bears the responsibility of maturing certain 
technologies within the FCS program that are critical to development efforts of the LSI.  
The armor for the manned ground vehicle is an example of such an instance: the 
performance of the LSI is dependent on the individual efforts of members of the Army 
technology community.  The nature of contract the LSI has with the Army makes it 
impossible to measure performance until the capability is proven, which will occur in the 
CDR.  Until then, the LSI is required to put forth its best effort to develop the Army’s 
needed capabilities.   
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The LSI in the FCS is also the second-tier contractor for the network in the FCS 
program.  This allocation is critical due to the overarching nature of the network within 
the system-of systems architecture of the FCS program. The software within the network 
will not be tested on the full FCS system until after the production decision in 2012. Until 
then, the software contractors will rely heavily on modeling, simulation and single-
system testing to test for effectiveness and suitability.  The resolution of any design 
issues during the production phase can prove to be extremely costly. The LSI has the 
responsibility of integrating all assets of the FCS through this network. However, the lack 
of sufficient testing and evaluation of the network in the SDD phase of the program can 
ultimately lead to under-performance of the entire FCS system in the areas of net-
centricity and interoperability.   
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A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
The primary research question was: What is the concept of the Lead Systems 
Integrator? 
The Lead Systems Integrator concept confers inherently governmental authority 
on a private-sector entity enabling it to develop and integrate system-of-systems 
acquisition programs. 
1. Supplemental Research Questions 
• How could the conceptual approach of the LSI increase the Government’s 
probability of attaining the best value? 
The conceptual approach of the LSI is intended to facilitate the acquisition of 
complex system-of-systems programs, specifically the systems integration aspect of a 
system-of-systems program.  This research shows that in order to perform as a system 
integrator, the LSI was given inherently governmental authority that was previously 
unavailable to traditional prime contractors. In order to obtain the best value from the 
LSI, the Government needed the LSI to perform the following functions: manage the 
complexity of the program; resource a capability gap in acquisition resources; and 
implement more competitive procedures for acquiring distinct elements of each program.   
•  How effective was the implementation of the LSI — based upon cost, 
schedule, and performance? 
The implementation of the LSI was clearly not effective with the Coast Guard’s 
Deepwater program. Deepwater continues to miss schedule on four critical assets, 
resulting in significant cost overruns.  The lack of system performance in delivered 
Deepwater assets has led the Coast Guard to modify its LSI approach.  The Coast Guard 
did not exercise proper oversight of the LSI to ensure information integrity and did not 
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implement an effective managerial structure to ensure factors such as organizational 
conflicts of interest did not hinder the program’s progress. 
The FCS program’s current cost, schedule and performance metrics indicate that 
the LSI implementation in the program is effective.  However, when put into the context 
of the original cost, schedule and performance goals of the program prior to its 
restructuring in 2004, the LSI implementation effectiveness can be questioned.  The LSI 
was supposed to aid the Army in refining requirements and managing the cost, schedule 
and performance variables of the FCS program.  The restructuring of the program added 
more cost, increased the schedule and redesigned certain performance aspects of the 
program.  However, now the Army maintains that the program is currently on schedule 
and under cost, according to the restructured program variables.  Even so, much of the 
performance of the FCS assets will not be demonstrated until after a Critical Design 
Review.  The LSI would have been paid much of its cost and incentive fees by that time, 
but may not deliver a working system. 
B. CONCLUSIONS  
The Lead Systems Integrator concept, as it is defined in this paper, can be an 
unsound practice due to the conferring of inherently governmental authority to a private-
sector entity without proper Government oversight.  Such inherently governmental 
authority can be used to conduct business in a way that does not serve the best interests of 
the Government.  There are certain responsibilities in Government acquisitions that must 
be kept solely governmental, and the management of cost, schedule and performance is 
one of those.  A private-sector entity should be encouraged to manage cost, schedule and 
performance, but the overall responsibility for these variables should be retained by the 
Government.  The probability of cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance 
shortfalls is too high if the Government lacks the capability to manage these themselves.  
A Lead Systems Integrator should not be pursued if current acquisition expertise in 
overall program management does not exist to provide oversight of the program.       
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The lessons learned by the Coast Guard should be carefully recorded to support 
future system-of-systems acquisition programs within the Government.  
More careful thought should be given to the sociological factors of a LSI 
acquisition approach. The assumption that sociological factors will be eliminated by 
contractual language and incentives fails to take into account that the LSI may think or 
behave in a manner other than expected. We suggest that these sociological problems 
related to OCIs can be decreased by utilizing Federally Funded Research and 
Development Centers (FFRDC), non-profit organizations, or academic universities as 
LSIs. These organizations could provide the right mix between public funding and 
private interest in order to ensure that the Government receives the best value.  
Unless the Government has sufficient resources and personnel to successfully 
oversee all aspects of a program’s acquisition and is able to verify the validity of 
information garnered from the LSI, the approach should not be considered. Utilizing a 
LSI and ensuring the integrity of information through third-party auditing is inefficient 
and undermines the conceptual reasoning behind utilizing a LSI. If the Government does 
not have resources and personnel to provide oversight of a program, then the Government 
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